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Differences in the Reliability of Fair Value Hierarchy Measurements: A 
Cross-Country Study 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior research suggests that there are significant differences in how investors perceive the 
reliability of fair values across the fair value hierarchy. An unaddressed question in this stream of 
research is whether cross-country differences in institutional factors are able to mediate 
differences in reliability for the fair value hierarchy measurements. Based on an international 
sample of banks across 20 different countries, we find that the probability of crash risk is lower 
among countries with better financial development infrastructure, greater level of trust, tighter 
security regulations and higher level of disclosure requirements. These results apply to Level 1 
assets but not to Level 2 and Level 3 assets. We also document that these cross-country factors 
improve the trading volume of our sample banks. Our study suggests that while ongoing 
concerns toward the more opaque fair values are not fully eliminated by institutional differences, 
they matter in influencing investor willingness to trade in these stocks. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines whether institutional country differences are able to influence 
investors’ perceptions towards the reliability of fair value hierarchy measurements. Prior 
research documents that investors perceive reliability concerns toward the more subjective fair 
value measurements (i.e., Level 2 and 3 fair value measurements) relative to fair value 
measurements that are derived directly from market prices (i.e., Level 1 fair value 
measurements). 
An unaddressed question in this stream of research is whether cross-country institutional 
factors are able to mediate differences in reliability across the fair value hierarchy measurements. 
Prior research suggests that institutional factors are important toward the enforcement of 
financial reporting (e.g., Christensen et al. 2013). In our study, we examine whether differences 
across countries in terms of its sophistication of financial development, level of trust in a country, 
the extent of security regulations, and the amount of disclosure requirements will affect 
differences in the reliability of reported fair values.  
This issue is important because much of the controversy with regard to fair value 
accounting stems from concerns regarding the reliability of inputs that are used in measuring fair 
values (Ryan 2008). While Level 1 fair value measurements are less controversial, the use of 
Level 2 and Level 3 fair value inputs (otherwise known as the mark-to-model approach) has 
generated tremendous concern and interest among standard setters, regulators and academics 
because the measurement of fair values based on these inputs are perceived to involve a certain 
degree of subjectivity and uncertainty (e.g., Song et al. 2010; Riedl and Serafeim 2011; Magnan 
et al. 2014; Chung et al. 2016).  
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Prior research on fair value hierarchy measurements tend to focus on US firms due to 
availability of data of reported fair values. We believe we are the first study to examine fair value 
hierarchy measurements in an international setting. We obtain our data from the SNL Global 
coverage database that provides international coverage of banks’ fair value data both within and 
outside US. Based on this database, we are able to obtain cross-country data on fair value 
measurements across 20 different countries located in Americas, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
We use four different country-level measures to test differences regarding the reliability 
of fair value measurements in an international context. Our country variables are based on 
various World Bank surveys that provide significant cross-sectional variations to our sample 
countries. Our first country level variable measures the extent of financial development in a 
country based on the level of sophistication of the country’s stock market and the level of 
financial intermediaries in extending credit to the economy. This measure is also viewed as a 
country-level financial constraint measure. This is because richer countries which might have 
higher quality institutions and laws, in general, tend to be associated with better financial 
development regardless of the content of these laws and security enforcement (La Porta 1999). 
Our second cross-country level variable measures the overall level of trust in the country. 
We believe trust is an important concept in accounting because the value of accounting lies in 
how much investors and other stakeholders trust the financial statements. This is especially so in 
situations where there appears to be significant concerns toward reported accounting information 
that involves professional estimates and subjective judgments, such as fair value measurements 
(e.g., Bell and Griffin 2012; Christensen et al. 2012). Fair value measurements, especially those 
measurements that involve Level 3 inputs, require considerable amount of subjectivity and 
3 
 
measurement uncertainty. Hence, cross-country differences in the overall level of trust might 
impact the extent to which market participants rely on fair value measurements in their investing 
decisions (e.g., Nanda and Wysocki 2013).  
Our third country variable measures the extent of security regulations enforced within the 
country. This measure is a proxy for the degree of investor protection through security laws and 
other legislation. We use a composite measure of the mean of the disclosure index, the liability 
standard index, and the public enforcement index to capture this construct (La Porta et al. 2006). 
Finally, our fourth country variable measures the amount of disclosure requirements within a 
country. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), our disclosure requirements index variable is defined 
as the arithmetic mean of these various measures - Prospectus, Compensation, Shareholders, 
Inside Ownership, Irregular Contracts and Transactions.   
We examine whether these four institutional factors will impact the probability of crash 
risk, return synchronicity and trading volume in relation to reported fair values in the banks’ 
balance sheets. Crash risk relates to the probability of stock market crash in a firm’s stock price 
as a result of a revelation of negative news that lead investors to significantly downgrade their 
assessments of a firm’s prospects (e.g., Jin and Myers 2006). Prior studies on crash risk suggest 
that this phenomenon is exacerbated when a firm has a greater level of asset opacity in its 
financial reporting. To the extent that Level 2 and 3 fair value measurements are less transparent 
than Level 1 fair value measurements (market-based prices), information dissemination relating 
to changes in these reported amounts might exacerbate stock price crash risk.  
 Return synchronicity relates to the extent a firm’s stock return varies with market return. 
Extant research on stock market synchronicity suggests that the explanatory power of firm’s 
stock return with the market return is lower when there is greater transparency and more 
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complete revelation of firm-specific information (e.g., Morck, Yeung and Yu 2000). With regard 
to fair value accounting, fair values are purported to be more transparent and relevant to decision 
makers. However, differences across the subjectivity of fair value inputs might impact the extent 
to which fair value reporting provides useful information to financial statement readers. To the 
extent that fair values are reliable and relevant, we expect return synchronicity to be lower. In 
contrast, opaque fair values might increase market return synchronicity in a firm’s stock returns. 
Our third outcome variable is trading volume, which measures the extent to which investor is 
willing to trade in the shares of firms with reported fair values. If investors trust the reporting 
reliability of fair values, we expect trading volume to be high. Conversely, if reported fair values 
represent significant concerns to market participants, we expect trading volume in the shares of 
firms with high reported fair values in their balance sheets to be muted. 
Our first set of tests examines whether institutional factors account for country variation 
in stock price crash risk and return synchronicity in reported fair values. We find consistent 
empirical evidence to suggest that institutional factors are able to mediate the relation between 
Level 1 fair value measurements and stock price crash risk. Specifically, the extent of a country’s 
financial development, overall level of trust, the extent of security regulations, and the amount of 
disclosure requirements are negatively associated with stock price crash risk for reported Level 1 
fair values. However, these institutional factors appear to have little effect in mediating the 
relation towards alleviating stock price crash risk for Level 2 and Level 3 fair value 
measurements. Likewise, we find corroborating evidence for Level 1 fair value measurements in 
our return synchronicity tests but these institutional factors do not affect how reported Level 2 
and 3 fair value measurements affect crash risk and return synchronicity.  
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Our second set of tests examines the impact on institutional factors on trading volume. 
Specifically, we examine whether institutional factors are able to mediate the relation between 
reported fair values and trading volume. In these results, we find strong evidence that 
institutional factors have a positive effect on reported fair values across all three fair value 
designations. The incremental impact on trading volume is especially striking for the Level 2 and 
3 fair value measurements. We interpret these results to suggest that institutional factors matter 
greatly to market participants in considering whether to trade the shares of banks that report 
significant amounts of Level 2 and 3 assets in their balance sheets. It appears that investors are 
relatively disinclined to invest in the companies of countries that have poor financial 
development and security regulation, low overall societal trust and lax disclosure requirements. 
We conjecture that the relative lack of investor interest in these firms is because there might be 
questionable doubts regarding the reliability of the fair value measurements on these firms’ 
balance sheets.   
We contribute to the research on fair value accounting by examining the impact of 
institutional factors toward the perceived reliability of fair value measurements in an 
international context. Prior studies have not examined fair value measurements in a cross-
country study presumably because of unavailability of data for reported fair value hierarchy 
measurements. Our study provides early evidence suggesting that fair value measurements across 
the fair value hierarchy are impacted by a country’s institutional background and financial 
development as well as the extent of its securities regulation and disclosure level.  
The next section develops our hypotheses development and the institutional background 
surrounding fair value measurements and the regulatory environment. Section 3 describes the 
sample and empirical measures. Section 4 discusses the test results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 Fair value hierarchy  
The issuance of FAS 157 (ASC 820) in September 2006 mandated a division of different 
classes of assets and liabilities into Level 1 observable inputs from quoted prices in active 
markets, Level 2 indirectly observable inputs from quoted prices of comparable items in active 
markets, identical items in inactive markets, or other market-related information and Level 3 
unobservable, firm- generated inputs. Improved disclosure requirements of methods and inputs 
in determining fair value were also made in this accounting standard. 
Since the advent of FAS 157, various studies have examined the market behavior towards 
the subjectivity of inputs used in each of these fair value levels. Song et al. (2010) and Riedl and 
Serafeim (2011) were the earlier studies that investigate the effect of different fair value levels 
on market pricing and information risk of assets respectively whereas Goh et al. (2015) and 
Chung et al. (2016) provide further cross sectional and longitudinal studies that build upon the 
earlier studies. There have also been studies that examine how the fair value hierarchy 
measurements affect analysts (e.g., Magnan et al. 2014; Barron et al. 2016). 
The focus of this literature is primarily confined to firms in the financial sector (e.g., 
banks, mortgage companies, insurance companies with a large concentration of financial 
instruments reported of fair value that were affected by the implementation of FAS 157). 
Notably, all these studies use firms within the US. Our study differs from this stream of research 
by being the first paper to examine firms outside the US. In particular, we focus on the impact of 
countries’ institutional factors in influencing investors’ perceptions regarding the reliability of 
these fair value measurements. 
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2.2 Institutional factors  
Extant research examines the impact of securities laws and stock market development on 
financial markets (e.g., Barth et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 2006). These studies generally find that 
securities laws and regulatory enforcement are important factors in influencing the development 
of financial markets. In addition, the availability of laws to mandate disclosure requirements and 
facilitate private enforcement through liability rules has also been shown to benefit stock markets. 
On the other hand, in the context of fair value measurements, the link between institutional 
environmental factors and the reliability of fair values have not been fully examined.  
Over the decades, there is also an emerging literature on trust. Trust plays an important 
role in the social and economic world. It is broadly defined as the subjective probability that an 
individual assigns to the events of a potential counterparty performing an action that is beneficial 
or at least not harmful to that individual (Gambetta, 1988). A group of researchers investigates 
the role of trust in economic development and economic efficiency (La Porta et al., 1997; Zak 
and Knack, 2001; Guiso, Sapienza and Zinagles, 2004). In the context of our study, trust has 
been alluded to but has not been examined in a fair value accounting setting.   
A recent trend in the literature is to use broad measures of trust from existing surveys to 
conduct studies related to trust. For example, Nanda and Wysocki (2013) investigate the relation 
between financial reporting transparency and societal trust. Trust is an important concept in 
accounting because the value of accounting lies in how much investors and other stakeholders 
trust the financial statements. Fair value measurements, especially those measurements that 
involve Level 3 inputs, require considerable amount of subjectivity and measurement uncertainty 
(Bell and Griffin 2012; Christensen et al. 2012). Recent developments in accounting standards 
have also provided firms with more discretion to decide what measurement basis to adopt. With 
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a move toward more fair value accounting in financial reporting, investors may become more 
skeptical about reported fair value information in the financial statements.   
2.3 Crash risk   
The theoretical crash risk model in Jin and Myers (2006) postulates that increased opacity 
in financial reporting lead to managers being able to withhold bad news from public disclosure. 
However, managers are only able to withhold bad news up to certain threshold. Once the 
threshold is met, the accumulated bad news are disclosed all at once, and market participants 
surprised by these news, will start to exit the market together, resulting in a stock price crash.  
A necessary condition for this phenomenon is the ability of managers to control public 
access to negative information about firm value, either through financial reporting or other 
mechanisms. Prior research has examined the impact of financial reporting transparency and 
accounting standards on crash risk (e.g., Hutton et al. 2009; DeFond et al. 2015). Hutton et al. 
(2009) use a firm-specific measure of opacity and find that more opaque firms are more prone to 
stock price crashes although the effect weakens in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period. DeFond et al. 
(2015) test whether mandatory IFRS adoption affects firm-level crash risk. Their results indicate 
that increased transparency from IFRS adoption has the effect of reducing crash risk among 
nonfinancial firms, but more selectively among financial firms, presumably because of the 
countervailing effects of fair value accounting to crash risk.  
On the one hand, fair value accounting might better reflect firms’ true underlying 
performance, thereby reducing crash risk (Bleck and Liu 2007). On the other hand, it might also 
introduce greater measurement errors in financial reporting, which reduce investors’ ability to 
observe firms’ true underlying performance (European Central Bank 2004). In the context of fair 
value hierarchy measurements, the fair value estimates of more opaque assets (i.e., Level 2 and 3 
9 
 
assets) may contain relatively more measurement errors, thus increasing financial reporting 
opacity.  
2.4 Return synchronicity  
Extant research on return synchronicity suggests that stock returns are less synchronous 
in more developed markets. For example, Morck et al. (2000) find that in emerging markets like 
China, Malaysia, and Poland, over 80% of stocks often move in the same direction in a given 
week. In contrast, Denmark, Ireland, and the United States lack any instances of more than 57% 
of the stocks moving in the same direction during any week. The authors suggest that this is 
because stock markets in poor economies are generally less developed. Thus there is poorer 
information transfer, which impede the capitalization of firm-specific information into stock 
prices. This effect would reduce firm-specific stock price variation, and increase stock return 
synchronicity with the market return.  
The notion that greater transparency and more complete revelation of firm-specific 
information will reduce return synchronicity has been extensively examined (e.g., Durnev et al. 
2003; Ashbaugh et al. 2005). In the context of fair value measurements, it remains to be seen 
whether fair values facilitate or worsen information sharing. This is especially so in relation to 
institutional factors in an international setting. For example, it is possible that country specific 
factors such as the extent of financial development or the effectiveness of security regulations 
can have a mediating effect on stock prices through reported fair values.  
2.5 Hypotheses development   
In this study, we use an international setting to study whether cross-country variation in 
institutional factors account for differences in the transparency of Level 2 and Level 3 fair value 
measurements. We use four empirical measures, the extent of a country’s financial development, 
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security regulations, disclosure requirements and the overall level of trust in a country, to proxy 
for cross-country differences in a firm’s business environment.  
We conjecture that the usefulness of fair value accounting depends on individual 
countries’ implementation of accounting rules and the proper enforcement of these rules. It also 
depends on how much and how willing market participants trust the reliability of fair values. To 
the extent that there are cultural and institutional factors determining the level of trust in a 
society, our study enables us to examine whether trust plays a mediating role toward the 
usefulness of fair values. 
As previously stated, studies that have examined crash risk and return synchronicity 
suggest that opacity in financial reporting will increase the occurrence of crash risk. In the fair 
value accounting research stream, reliability concerns toward reported fair values remain an 
ongoing concern. If fair value measurements are able to increase transparency in financial 
statements, we will expect the market participants to be informative about firm’s fundamentals 
when there is greater use of fair values in the financial statements. In our setting, we are 
interested to examine whether there are cross-country differences in the perceived reliability of 
reported fair values, and whether these differences will impact market outcomes. 
 We state our first set of hypotheses, in alternative form, as follows: 
H1a: Fair value accounting reduces the probability of crash risk and return synchronicity 
when the sophistication of a country’s financial development is higher.  
H1b: Fair value accounting reduces the probability of crash risk and return synchronicity 
when the overall level of trust in a country is higher.  
H1c: Fair value accounting reduces the probability of crash risk and return synchronicity 
when the extent of security regulations is greater.  
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H1d: Fair value accounting reduces the probability of crash risk and return synchronicity 
when there are more disclosure requirements.  
A second research question that we examine in this paper is whether market participants 
are more willing to trade in the shares of companies with high reported fair values in their 
balance sheets among countries with stronger institutional background (i.e., more well-regulated, 
better disclosure regimes) than in countries that have relatively weaker institutions and 
regulations. This question is particularly salient with regard to reported Level 2 and 3 fair values 
given the relatively lack of transparency in determining these reported amounts. 
We postulate that there is a cross-sectional difference in the willingness of investors to 
trade in the shares of banks with high reported fair values between countries with rich 
institutional background versus countries with relatively poor institutional background. As with 
our first set of hypotheses, we examine countries’ institutional factors relating to its financial 
development, overall trust level, sophistication of security regulations and level of disclosure 
requirements. 
We state our second set of hypotheses, in alternative form, as follows: 
H2a: Fair value accounting is positively associated with trading volume when the 
sophistication of a country’s financial development is higher.  
H2b: Fair value accounting is positively associated with trading volume when the overall 
level of trust in a country is higher.  
H2c: Fair value accounting is positively associated with trading volume when the extent 
of security regulations is greater.  
H2d: Fair value accounting is positively associated with trading volume when there are 
more disclosure requirements.  
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3. Research Design     
We obtain our fair value data from the SNL Global coverage database. This database 
provides international coverage of banks’ fair value data that is based on the fair value hierarchy 
classification, including countries in Americas, Europe, and Asia-Pacific region. We obtain our 
capital market data from Datastream to compute price and other market variables. We exclude 
sample firms that do not have a matching ISIN number with the SNL Global coverage database. 
Our sample period is from 2007 – 2015. We obtain an initial sample of 6,485 bank-year 
observations across 20 different countries with reported Level 1, 2 and 3 assets from this dataset.  
We use four different country-level measures in our regression analyses. We develop our 
composite-level variables from various World Bank surveys. Our first country level measure is 
Financial Development (FD). This variable measures the extent of financial development in a 
country along two dimensions. Specifically, it is measured as the sum of stock market 
development index and financial intermediary development index. The stock market 
development index is the sum of market capitalization over GDP, total value traded over GDP, 
and total value traded over market capitalization. The financial intermediary development index 
is the sum of liquid liabilities over GDP and the credit going to the private sector over GDP and 
is typically regarded as a country-level financial constraint measure.  
Our second cross-country level variable is Trust. Our measure of trust is based on the 
World Value Survey, defined by asking respondents the following question: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need have to be very careful in dealing 
with people?” The level of trust in each country is based on the percentage of respondents 
replying the following response “most people can be trusted”.  This measures ranges from 0% 
(absolute distrust) to 100% (absolute trust).  
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Our third measure is Security Regulation (SR). This is a country-level measure to proxy 
for the level of security laws and investor protection. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), this 
variable is defined as the mean of the disclosure index, the liability standard index, and the 
public enforcement index (La Porta et al. 2006). Our fourth country level measure is Disclosure. 
Following Hail and Leuz (2006), this variable is defined as the arithmetic mean of Prospect, 
Compensation, Shareholders, Inside Ownership, Irregular Contracts and Transactions.  
We estimate the following regressions to test our hypotheses:   
CRASHit = β0 + β 1 FVA1it + β2 FVA23it + β3 CROSS-COUNTRYit +  
+ β4 FVA1*CROSS-COUNTRYit +  β5 FVA23*CROSS-COUNTRYit  
+ β6 ROAit + β7 LEVERAGEit + β8 M2Bit + β9 SIZEit + εit  (1) 
SYNit = β0 + β 1 FVA1it + β2 FVA23it + β3 CROSS-COUNTRYit +  
+ β4 FVA1*CROSS-COUNTRYit +  β5 FVA23*CROSS-COUNTRYit  
+ β6 ROAit + β7 LEVERAGEit + β8 M2Bit + β9 SIZEit + εit  (2) 
VOLUMEit = β0 + β 1 FVA1it + β2 FVA23it + β3 CROSS-COUNTRYit +  
+ β4 FVA1*CROSS-COUNTRYit +  β5 FVA23*CROSS-COUNTRYit  
+ β6 ROAit + β7 LEVERAGEit + β8 M2Bit + β9 SIZEit + εit  (3) 
 
where CRASH is defined as the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over 
the fiscal year period based on Jin and Myers (2006). SYN is the return synchronicity of a firm’s 
stock returns with market returns. It is calculated as the log (R2 / 1 - R2) estimated from 
regressing weekly market return during the fiscal year on the firm’s stock return. VOLUME is the 
mean of weekly trading volume during the fiscal year. FVA1 is Level 1 fair value assets scaled 
by total outstanding shares during the fiscal year. FVA23 is the sum of Level 2 and Level 3 fair 
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value assets scaled by total outstanding shares during the fiscal year. The cross-country variables 
are Financial Development (FD), Trust, Security Regulation (SR), and Disclosure, as previously 
defined. In our regression analyses, our cross-country variables are indicator variables that equal 
one if their scores are above the median value, and zero otherwise.  
Following Hutton et al. (2009), we use the following firm-specific variables as control 
variables. SIZE is calculated as the log of total assets, ROA is earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is the book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets, and 
M2B is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. We also incorporate 
year and country fixed effects in our regression specifications. 
 
4. Empirical results     
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate results 
Table 1 reports our descriptive statistics for our sample. We report our fair value 
measures scaled by the total assets of the bank. The mean (median) value of FVA1 is 0.021 
(0.000), whereas the mean (median) value of FVA2 is 0.164 (0.145), and the mean (median) 
value of FVA3 is 0.018 (0.007). The descriptive statistics are generally consistent with the results 
reported in prior studies that indicate Level 2 assets represent the largest proportion of fair value 
assets on the bank’s balance sheet.  
For our dependent variables, the mean (median) value of our crash risk measure is -0.051 
(-0.055).  The mean (median) value of our return synchronicity measure is -2.622 (-2.091).  
Finally, the mean (median) value of our trading volume measure is 2.373 (0.020).  For our 
country level variables, the mean (median) value of Financial Development (FD) is 800.39 
(759.39) There is substantial variation in the level of financial development across our sample 
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countries. Panel B of Table 1 reports the sample distribution of these country variables. Across 
our sample countries, countries with well-developed financial services sectors such as Hong 
Kong (1711.42), USA (838.74), Switzerland (799.64), and UK (759.23) scored high on this 
measure, whereas countries such as Pakistan (105.12), and Philippines (188.12) have relatively 
lower scores.   
The mean (median) value of TRUST is 0.371 (0.382) indicating that about 37-38% of the 
population in our sample expressed trust towards others in business dealings. Among the 
countries that have higher level of trust are Australia (0.533), Finland (0.588), Netherlands 
(0.602) and Sweden (0.680). In contrast, Philippines (0.028) and Malaysia (0.085) are countries 
that indicate the lowest level of trust towards others in our sample countries. Our third cross-
country variable is Security Regulation (SR). Across our sample countries, high SR scores are 
found in countries such as USA (2.900), Canada (2.717), and Singapore (2.527) whereas 
countries that report low level of security regulation are Germany (0.633), Sweden (1.358) and 
Italy (1.370).  Our fourth cross-country variable is Disclosure. Similar to our Security Regulation 
variable, we find that countries that have relatively high level of disclosure requirements are 
USA (1.000), Singapore (1.000) and Canada (0.917). In contrast, countries with low disclosure 
scores include Germany (0.417), Finland (0.500) and Netherlands (0.500).  
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations among our variables used in our analyses. 
Among the fair value variables, we find that FVA1 and FVA2 are negatively correlated with each 
other whereas FVA2 is negatively correlated with FVA3. With regard to the outcome variables, 
crash risk is positively correlated with Financial Development (0.057) and Trust (0.044) but 
negatively correlated with Security Regulation (-0.039) and Disclosure (0.039). We also find that 
return synchronicity is negatively correlated with all the four institutional factors. Interestingly, 
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we find that FVA1 tend to be negatively correlated with the institutional factors while FVA2 tend 
to be positively correlated with them. FVA3 is negatively correlated with Financial Development 
(-0.036) and Trust (-0.062). 
Among the cross-country variables, Financial Development is positively correlated with 
Trust (0.537), Security Regulation (0.394), and Disclosure (0.435). These correlations are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Likewise, Trust is positively correlated with Security 
Regulation (0.246) and Disclosure (0.268), These correlations are also statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. Not surprisingly, we find Security Regulation is strongly correlated with 
Disclosure (0.953).  
4.2 Crash risk and return synchronicity analyses 
Table 3 reports the results of our regression analyses from regressing crash risk on our 
various cross-country variables. We combine Level 2 and Level 3 assets (FVA23) to differentiate 
this variable from FVA1 which uses solely market-based prices when estimating fair values. 
Prior literature asserts that Level 1 assets are more reliable because they rely directly on market 
prices in determining fair values. In contrast, FVA23 represent fair values of financial assets that 
are subject to some form of managerial discretion during the fair value estimation process.  
Prior studies on crash risk suggest that greater transparency will reduce the probability of 
crash risk but do not examine the interaction effect of cross-country effects on fair value 
measurements. In our tests, we document significant cross-country effects across our interaction 
variables of interest for Level 1 assets. In particular, we find a negative association between 
Level 1 fair value assets and crash risk among countries with a higher level of Financial 
Development, Trust, Security Regulation and Disclosure. The coefficients on our interaction 
variables on Level 1 assets are negative and statistically significant for FVA1 x FD (-1.639, t-
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stat=-2.420), FVA1 x Trust (-1.208, t-stat=-1.672), FVA1 x SR (-1.782, t-stat=-2.571), and FVA1 
x Disclosure (-1.712, t-stat=-2.654). FVA1 x Disclosure is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level and FVA1 x FD and FVA1 x SR are significant at the 0.05 level whereas FVA1 x Trust is 
significant at the 0.10 level.  
We interpret these results suggest that there is a cross-country effect for crash risk among 
countries with better developed financial development infrastructure, greater security regulations, 
and higher level of trust and disclosure requirements. However, it appears that these cross-
country improvements impact differences in crash risk for Level 1 assets but not in Level 2 and 
Level 3 assets. That is, we do not find any cross-country variables that reduce the probability of 
crash risk inherent in non-market based fair values (i.e., Level 2 and 3 assets) in these tests. 
Table 4 reports the results of regressing return synchronicity on our cross-country 
variables. These test results corroborate our earlier tests using crash risk as the dependent 
variable. We find statistically significant cross-country effects in countries with greater Security 
regulation and Disclosure requirements. However, we do not find statistically results for 
Financial Development and Trust. Consistent with the results in our crash risk tests, the impact 
from cross-country effects on return synchronicity as a result of better security regulations and 
disclosure requirements apply only to Level 1 fair value assets. Specifically, the coefficients on 
our interaction variables on Level 1 assets are negative and statistically significant for FVA1 x SR 
(-6.232, t-stat=-4.122), and FVA1 x Disclosure (-2.650, t-stat=-1.880). 
On the other hand, we do not find any statistical difference with regard to the incremental 
impact to return synchronicity for Level 2 and 3 assets across any of these four cross-country 
variables. One interpretation of both sets of results is that cross-country differences in financial 
infrastructure, security regulations, and levels of trust and disclosure requirements do not seem to 
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alleviate reliability concerns toward Level 2 and 3 assets. Hence, asset opacity in Level 2 and 3 
assets remain high even in well-developed financial markets.   
4.3 Trading volume analyses 
Table 5 reports the results of regressing trading volume on our cross-country variables. In 
countries with better quality financial infrastructure, greater security regulation, and higher level 
of trust and disclosure, there appears to be greater confidence towards reported fair values, which 
translates to higher trading volume among the shares of these banks. The strongest country 
effects reside in differences in security regulations and disclosure requirements. Specifically, we 
find positive associations for our FVA1 and FVA2 interaction cross-country variables among 
countries with high level of security regulation and disclosure compared with countries with lax 
security regulation and poor disclosure requirements. The coefficients for FVA1 x SR and FVA2 
x SR are 24.81 and 18.57 respectively, both statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Likewise, 
the coefficients for FVA1 x Disclosure and FVA2 x Disclosure are 16.33 and 19.59 respectively, 
also statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These results suggest that tighter security 
regulations and greater disclosure requirements inspire investor confidence to trade in the shares 
of banks with a large proportion of fair value assets.  
Apart from the above results, we also find that investors are more willing to trade in the 
shares of banks with Level 2 and 3 assets in countries with more well-developed financial 
development infrastructure (FD), and in countries where there is a greater level of trust. Overall, 
the results suggest that there is a significant cross-country effect to differences in trading volume. 
It appears that investors are less reserved toward banks with greater reported Level 2 and Level 3 
fair values if these banks are located in countries with better security regulations and disclosure 
requirements. We also find similar results for Level 1 assets in the predicted direction although 
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the results are not statistically significant. These results suggest that a country’s level of financial 
development and the cross-country differences in a country’s level of trust plays a less important 
role in influencing trading volume for banks with different amounts of Level 1 assets, 
presumably because there is less concern toward Level 1 assets in the first place.  
Overall, we document that there are significant cross-country differences in the level of 
trading volume among banks with different amounts of reported Level 2 and Level 3 assets. It 
appears that cross-country effects have a mediating effect on trading volume with regard to 
differences in reported fair values in banks’ balance sheets.  
 
5. Conclusion     
   In this study, we examine how country’s institutional factors are able to play a 
mediating role in affecting reliability concerns towards fair value measurements. Using various 
empirical measures to proxy for a country’s level of financial development, extent of security 
regulations and disclosure requirements, as well as its overall level of trust, we find that these 
institutional factors matter to investors when trading the shares of banks with high reported fair 
value figures in their balance sheets. Specifically, our tests reveal that investors are relatively 
disinclined to invest in the companies of countries that have poor financial development and 
security regulation, low overall societal trust and lax disclosure requirements, where there might 
be questionable doubts regarding the reliability of the fair value measurements on the firms’ 
balance sheets.   
We also show whether these institutional factors mediate the relation between the 
probability of crash risk and return synchronicity. The study of tail events such as crash risk is 
particularly relevant to debates regarding fair value accounting as it is a policy issue whether 
20 
 
firms that have more assets that are fair valued in their balance sheets are more likely to suffer 
from higher crash risk owing to concerns regarding the transparency of these assets and the 
subjectivity of the fair value estimation processes. We find empirical evidence suggesting that 
country’s institutional factors are able to mediate the Level 1 fair values, but not Level 2 and 3 
fair values. 
Our study extends prior research on the fair value hierarchy measurements. We provide 
empirical evidence that assess how various countries’ institutional differences might alleviate 
significant reliability concerns toward fair value measurements. In doing so, we shed further 
light toward a better understanding of the usefulness of fair value accounting in relation to 
various market outcome factors in an international setting. Our study also contributes to the 
ongoing debate regarding the role of fair value measurements on financial markets. 
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TABLE 1: Sample Composition  
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample banks. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics 
of the variables used in our regression analyses and Panel B provides our sample distribution and the 
values of our country variables. FVA1 is Level 1 fair value assets scaled by total assets during the year. 
FVA2 is Level 2 fair value assets scaled by total assets during the year. FVA3 is Level 3 fair value assets 
scaled by total assets during the year. CRASH is defined as the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly 
returns calculated over the fiscal year. SYN is defined as the return synchronicity of a firm’s stock returns 
with market returns. It is calculated as the log (R2 / 1-R2) estimated from regressing weekly market return 
during the fiscal year on the firm’s stock return. VOLUME is the mean of weekly trading volume during 
the fiscal year. FD is the measure for the extent of financial development in a country, TRUST is the 
measure for the extent of trust in a country, DISCLOSURE is the measure of the extent of disclosure in a 
country, SIZE is calculated as the log of total assets, ROA is earnings before extraordinary items divided 
by total assets, LEVERAGE is the book value of total liabilities scaled by total assets, and M2B is the ratio 
of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
   Obs Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl Median 95th Pctl 
  
        
FVA1  6485 0.021 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.136 
FVA2  6485 0.164 0.130 0.004 0.145 0.388 
FVA3  6485 0.018 0.049 0.000 0.007 0.062 
CRASH  4531 -0.051 0.862 -1.276 -0.055 1.092 
SYN  3908 -2.622 2.522 -7.182 -2.091 0.287 
VOLUME  4910 2.373 13.04 0.001 0.020 9.067 
FD  6485 800.39 209.24 450.69 759.39 1171.38 
TRUST  6485 0.371 0.072 0.195 0.382 0.396 
DISCLOSURE  6485 0.963 0.104 0.667 1.000 1.000 
SIZE  6485 14.505 2.243 11.823 13.889 19.306 
ROA  6485 0.004 0.015 -0.015 0.006 0.014 
LEVERAGE  6475 0.099 0.086 0.000 0.079 0.260 
M2B  4415 1.041 0.969 0.181 0.922 2.139 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution 
 Country Obs FD Trust SR Disclose 
    
Australia 76 522.19 0.533 2.310 0.750 
Canada 3 579.03 0.421 2.717 0.917 
Finland 7 389.43 0.588 1.477 0.500 
France 106 419.67 0.187 1.737 0.750 
Germany 43 451.69 0.403 0.633 0.417 
Hong Kong 53 1711.42 0.470 2.443 0.917 
Italy 133 460.65 0.292 1.370 0.667 
Malaysia 48 449.98 0.085 2.343 0.917 
Netherlands 16 627.51 0.602 1.855 0.500 
Pakistan 2 105.12 0.239 1.552 0.583 
Philippines 131 188.12 0.028 2.667 0.833 
Singapore 22 579.12 0.385 2.527 1.000 
South Africa 23 489.75 0.236 1.743 0.833 
South Korea 49 624.63 0.297 1.660 0.750 
Spain 53 688.02 0.196 1.493 0.500 
Sweden 9 609.74 0.680 1.358 0.583 
Switzerland  62 799.64 0.511 1.440 0.667 
Thailand 13 457.64 0.326 1.855 0.917 
UK 66 759.23 0.304 2.177 0.833 
USA 5,570 838.74 0.384 2.900 1.000 
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TABLE 2 Correlations among key variables 
 
This table presents the Pearson correlations among the variables used in the empirical analyses. The variables are defined in Table 1. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
FVA1 (1) 1.000 -0.032*** 0.014 0.015 0.202*** 0.226*** -0.287*** -0.278*** -0.501*** -0.520*** 
           
FVA2(2)  1.000 -0.022* -0.023 0.034 0.152*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
           
FVA3 (3)   1.000 0.013 -0.072*** -0.001 -0.036*** -0.062*** -0.003 -0.001 
           
CRASH (4)    1.000 0.067*** 0.013 0.057*** 0.044*** -0.039*** -0.039*** 
           
SYN (5)     1.000 0.150*** -0.017 -0.045*** -0.228*** -0.242*** 
           
VOLUME (6)      1.000 -0.055*** -0.088*** -0.229*** -0.229*** 
           
FD (7)       1.000 0.537*** 0.394*** 0.435*** 
           
TRUST (8)        1.000 0.246*** 0.268*** 
        
SR (9)         1.000 0.953*** 
           
DISCLOSURE (10)          1.000 
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TABLE 3: Crash risk analyses   
This table presents the results of the regressions from regressing crash risk on various cross-country indicator 
variables. The cross-country variables are FD, Trust, SR, and Disclosure. Our cross-country variables are indicator 
variables that equal one if their scores are above the median value, and zero otherwise. All the variables are defined 
in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
Crash risk 
 
 FD 
(1) 
Trust 
(2) 
SR 
(3) 
Disclosure 
(4) 
      
FVA1  1.232** 0.872 1.103** 1.310** 
  (2.007) (1.434) (1.972) (2.172) 
FVA23  -0.174 -0.190 -0.202 -0.172 
  (-1.167) (-1.281) (-1.423) (-1.155) 
Cross-country  0.110 0.287* 0.112 0.179 
  (0.589) (1.837) (0.450) (0.561) 
FVA1 × Cross-country  -1.639** -1.208* -1.782** -1.712*** 
  (-2.420) (-1.672) (-2.571) (-2.654) 
FVA23 × Cross-country   0.0330 0.0321 0.0718 0.0118 
  (0.159) (0.155) (0.346) (0.0567) 
ROA  0.122 -0.003 -0.112 0.025 
  (1.08) (-0.02) (-0.55) (0.14) 
LEVERAGE  -6.815*** -6.850*** -6.907*** -6.885*** 
  (-5.478) (-5.506) (-5.558) (-5.541) 
M2B   -0.335* -0.338* -0.373* -0.331* 
  (-1.743) (-1.758) (-1.944) (-1.721) 
SIZE  -0.0115 -0.00893 -0.00633 -0.00685 
  (-0.757) (-0.587) (-0.418) (-0.453) 
Constant  -0.432 -0.634** -0.461 -0.505 
  (-1.414) (-2.269) (-1.383) (-1.453) 
      
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,022 4,022 4,022 4,022 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0284 0.0284 0.0286 0.0289 
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TABLE 4: Return synchronicity analyses  
This table presents the results of the regressions from regressing return synchronicity on various cross-country 
variables. The cross-country variables are FD, Trust, SR, and Disclosure. Our cross-country variables are indicator 
variables that equal one if their scores are above the median value, and zero otherwise. All the variables are defined 
in Table 1. t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
Synchronicity  
 
 FD 
(1) 
Trust 
(2) 
SR 
(3) 
Disclosure 
(4) 
      
FVA1  -2.926** -3.422** 0.0137 -1.259 
  (-2.155) (-2.539) (0.0112) (-0.949) 
FVA23  -1.531*** -1.456*** -1.673*** -1.499*** 
  (-4.645) (-4.455) (-5.348) (-4.567) 
Cross-country  1.086*** 0.831** -0.346 0.880 
  (2.662) (2.422) (-0.642) (1.263) 
FVA1 × Cross-country  -0.363 0.669 -6.232*** -2.650* 
  (-0.245) (0.422) (-4.122) (-1.880) 
FVA23 × Cross-country   -0.0816 -0.246 0.150 -0.0412 
  (-0.178) (-0.539) (0.329) (-0.0899) 
ROA  2.164 2.134 2.264 2.273 
  (0.790) (0.779) (0.829) (0.830) 
LEVERAGE  0.383 0.384 0.265 0.394 
  (0.905) (0.906) (0.627) (0.930) 
M2B   0.210*** 0.211*** 0.217*** 0.207*** 
  (5.923) (5.956) (6.154) (5.866) 
SIZE  0.923*** 0.922*** 0.923*** 0.919*** 
  (45.80) (45.81) (45.93) (45.63) 
Constant  -18.45*** -18.14*** -16.87*** -18.11*** 
  (-27.37) (-29.42) (-23.10) (-23.88) 
      
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3,886 3,886 3,886 3,886 
Adjusted R-squared  0.447 0.447 0.449 0.447 
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TABLE 5: Trading volume analyses  
This table presents the results of the regressions from regressing trading volume on various cross-country variables. 
The cross-country variables are FD, Trust, SR, and Disclosure. Our cross-country variables are indicator variables 
that equal one if their scores are above the median value, and zero otherwise. All the variables are defined in Table 1. 
t-statistics, in parentheses, are indicated below the coefficients. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 
1 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
Trading volume 
 
 FD 
(1) 
Trust 
(2) 
SR 
(3) 
Disclosure 
(4) 
      
FVA1  11.65** 14.10*** 9.783** 10.48** 
  (2.084) (2.619) (2.211) (2.354) 
FVA23  3.575* 3.425** 4.536*** 3.087* 
  (1.944) (1.962) (2.615) (1.726) 
Cross-country  -5.173** -6.127*** -1.516 -6.899*** 
  (-2.128) (-4.110) (-0.943) (-2.803) 
FVA1 × Cross-country  9.272 8.837 24.81*** 16.33*** 
  (1.500) (1.385) (3.431) (2.607) 
FVA23 × Cross-country   18.59*** 20.47*** 18.57*** 19.59*** 
  (7.388) (8.251) (7.259) (7.771) 
ROA  -26.99* -29.69* -26.43* -28.09* 
  (-1.695) (-1.867) (-1.662) (-1.767) 
LEVERAGE  -0.384 -0.595 0.298 -0.506 
  (-0.162) (-0.252) (0.126) (-0.214) 
M2B   -0.707*** -0.732*** -0.765*** -0.749*** 
  (-3.480) (-3.607) (-3.754) (-3.682) 
SIZE  2.206*** 2.218*** 2.196*** 2.215*** 
  (19.10) (19.23) (19.01) (19.21) 
Constant  -33.51*** -33.01*** -37.75*** -32.50*** 
  (-8.708) (-10.30) (-11.75) (-8.820) 
      
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  4,346 4,346 4,346 4,346 
Adjusted R-squared  0.290 0.293 0.292 0.292 
 
